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Heald: Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four Causes of Action

PAYMENT DEMANDS FOR SPURIOUS
COPYRIGHTS: FOUR CAUSES OF ACTION
Paul J. Heald*
"COPYING IS ILLEGAL" declares the final page of the chorus
from the Bach cantata' lying to the right of my computer. The
slogan is ingeniously printed in gray across the entire page so that
it will show up clearly if any photocopies are made. The first page
of the text contains the copyright symbol and the name and address
of the "sole selling agent" of the putative copyright owner.
Apparently, the copyright claimant would prefer to sell additional
copies of the music rather than receive royalties for copying done
by users. "ALL COPYING IS ILLEGAL" states the edition of
Shakespeare's Henry IV, Part II, that is propped up against the left
side of my computer. Those desiring to make photocopies of any
part of the text are directed in stern tones to send $1.00 per copy
to the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), Washington, D.C., or face
dire consequences. 2
A claim of copyright is a serious claim. Federal law carries with
it substantial criminal (up to ten years in prison)3 and civil (actual
damages or up to $100,000 in statutory damages) penalties for
copyright violations. Although many people undoubtedly ignore the
copyright symbol and duplicate as they please,4 others are willing
to buy more than one copy of the work covered by the putative
copyright, pay a royalty to the copyright claimant, or more likely,

* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. J.D., University of Chicago,
1988. Thanks to Bob Brussack, Susan Cornfield, Bill Coscarelli, Andrew Kull, Ray Patterson, and Jerre Swann, Jr. for their much appreciated help.

Johann Sebastian Bach, Crown Him Kingof Kings, from AUF, SCHMETTERNDE TONE DER
MUNTERN TROMPETEN (BMV 207a).
' Cf. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 7 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). The Copyright Clearance Center is a non-profit organization of publishers that
collects and distributes licensing fees for photocopying materials that are registered with it.
As of 1990, over 8000 publishers had registered over 1.5 million texts with the CCC. See
generally id. at 4-9 (providing details on compliance with CCC).
3 17 U.S.C § 506(a) (1988) & 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a)-(b) (1988) (enumerating various criminal
penalties available under various circumstances).
'See R. Ellickson, Photocopying Norms of Law Professors, QUADRANGLE (Mich. Law
School Alumni Magazine) (1993) (discussing photo copying behavior of law faculty).
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remit $1.00 a page to the CCC. Whether the motivation of the
payor is fear or a sense of duty (or guilt?), the placement of the
copyright symbol on a work clearly affects consumer behavior. It
is meant to, and, for the most part, the transactions prompted by
copyright notices are not problematic.
The inducing of consumer payments for works in the public
domain,5 however, raises serious issues of impropriety, as do
overbroad claims of right made to validly copyrighted works.
Neither the Bach cantata nor the Shakespearean play mentioned
above was ever copyrighted, 6 and had they been, they would have
passed into the public domain long ago, free for anyone to use.7 A
publisher who falsely claims the benefits of copyright law misleads
the consumer into paying a royalty or buying another work (to
avoid photocopying) in a situation where no payment need be made
and photocopying is entirely permissible. A related problem occurs
when a consumer pays a royalty or purchases an extra copy of a
work where photocopying of the text would have constituted a "fair
8
use."

' Any work published more than seventy-five years ago is in the public domain as a
matter of law. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1988) (providing specific details and limitations on
renewal terms). Many other works published since then are also unprotected due to failure
to renew a copyright, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 24, 25 (1909) (repealed 1947), lack of originality, see
Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (telephone white pages
unprotectable), or the merger doctrine, see Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir.
1990) (when ideas or facts can only be expressed in a particular manner, content, and form,
they are said to merge with the underlying expression, which is then unprotectable). This
Article will not explore hard questions of what works lie at the fringes of the public domain,
e.g., how different must a rearrangement of a Bach Cantata be in order to pass Feist's
originality test?
6 Copyright law as we know it did not exist at the time of Bach and Shakespeare,
although the exclusive right to publish several of Shakespeare's works was held by the
London Stationers' Company.
7 The Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710), upon which the Constitution's Copyright
Clause was patterned, was the first copyright statute and limited the duration of a copyright
to fourteen years, with the possibility of a fourteen-year renewal term.
s See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988):
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction
in copies or phonorecords or by any other means... for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship or research, is not an infringement
of copyright.
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Appendixes A, B, and C to this Article contain common examples
of copyright claims made to public domain materials.9 We should
be worried about publishers' indiscriminate and overreaching
attempts to obtain compensation for any and all copying of
expression.1 0
The purpose of the Copyright Clause' of the
Constitution is to encourage authors to create literary works that
will eventually enter the public domain. Congress has chosen to
stimulate these creations by granting limited monopoly rights to
authors.12 When consumers are induced to pay for materials
unnecessarily, the cost of using expression rises and the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution and of Congress is frustrated. The
grant of copyright is designed to "promote the Progress of Science
and the Useful Arts," not to frustrate the exploitation of knowledge
that the federal statute and the Constitution declare is free for all
to use.
Unfortunately, current practice seems to provide few disincentives for the impoverishment of the public domain. Why shouldn't
a publisher claim rights in public domain material? Why not affix
threatening language that will intimidate consumers into paying
for otherwise fair uses of validly copyrighted material? The cost of
affixing a copyright notice or threatening language is very low, and
the rewards can be substantial. Those consumers who are
intimidated will pay; those who understand that a Bach Cantata or
Shakespearean play belongs to the public will not. In either event,
the putative copyright holder sees only a potential gain; economics
and common sense would predict that, in the absence of a significant deterring cost, spurious claims of copyright will proliferate.'"
9 The author would like to note that the examples contained in the appendixes were
chosen at random. These examples illustrate a common practice of the industry, and are not
intended to bear upon the reputation or character of any individual publisher.
'0 The preparation of the appendixes illustrates this concern in a humorous and ironic
way. I had assigned to my assistant the preparation of high quality, reduced copies for the
appendixes. Shortly he returned, unsuccessful, having been denied by the copy shop for lack
of written permission from the publisher. The absurdity climaxed when the copy shop,
fearful of violating the copyright laws if they did the work themselves, nevertheless assisted
my assistant in the preparation of the copies.
" U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12See 17 U.S.C. § 101, §§ 302-305 (1988) (providing for copyright protection expiring
seventy-five years from death of author).
13Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 187-91 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that

accidents will increase in absence of adequate deterrence costs).
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This Article proposes four causes of action that could raise the cost
of making spurious claims and threats, thereby deterring this
current practice and protecting the integrity of the public domain.
Part I of this Article explores arguments based on breach of
warranty and failure of consideration and examines precedent
authorizing a licensee to recover royalties paid for the use of
expression later found to be in the public domain. Part II makes
related restitutionary arguments based on unjust enrichment and
mistaken payment principles. Part III argues that common-law
fraud causes of action should be applicable to false copyright claims
made deliberately or recklessly. Part IV demonstrates that various
consumer protection statutes expressly incorporating FTC false
advertising principles provide very promising protection for the
public domain. Finally, the viability of class action implementation
of these causes of action is discussed briefly.
I. BREACH OF WARRANTY
A cause of action based on breach of warranty of title, as opposed
to one seeking restitution based on fraudulent inducement or
mistaken payment, 14 affirms the contract made by the parties and
seeks damages measured by the difference in the value of the goods
as promised and as received.15 In the absence of express limitations on warranty, the victim of the breach is entitled to the benefit
of his or her bargain. If the promised consideration is only worth
half of what was promised, the difference is recoverable. If the
purchased item is worthless, the entire purchase price constitutes
the measure of the loss.
The relationship between the consumer paying for the right to
use expression and a publisher claiming a copyright is contractual
in nature. The demand for a direct royalty or remittance of $1.00

14See Part II.

See Perry v. Steward Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1205 (measuring damages for breach of
warranty by difference in property's value with and without defect); cf U.C.C. § 2-714(2)
(providing that "[tihe measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference ...
between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been
as warranted"). Although Article 2 is probably not applicable to copyrights, see U.C.C. § 2105 (defining goods as "movable"), section 2-714(2) embodies the common-law damage
principle for breach of warranty.
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per page to the CCC can be characterized as an offer to enter into
a limited license. In essence, the offer takes two implied forms: "If
you pay the requested amount, you may exercise a non-exclusive
right to copy the work" or "If you pay the requested amount, I
promise not to sue you for copyright infringement." When payment
is tendered, the offer is accepted. A bare copyright symbol with no
accompanying language specifying an amount or a payee would
seem to be merely an invitation to negotiate, not definite enough to
be amenable to immediate acceptance.l' Also, a copyright symbol
with a bare designation of a selling agent for additional copies of
the work would similarly seem to be an invitation to negotiate a
future sale with the agent.'7
Although the contract that results upon tender of payment by the
consumer is quite barebones, the presence of the copyright symbol
undoubtedly serves as an implied warranty that the putative owner
has a valid copyright in the work.' 8 The symbol, combined with
the request for compensation, communicates to the reasonable
offeree the claim that a valid and enforceable copyright has been
obtained by the offeror. The symbol is, in essence, an implied
warranty of title. 19 This warranty is breached if the promisor is
not the owner because the expression subject to the transaction is
in the public domain.
Several decisions from the New York Court of Appeals strongly
support the position that when the warranty of title to a copyright
is breached because the work is in the public domain, the putative
copyright holder must refund any payment made by the offeree. In
Tams-Witmark Music Library v. New Opera Co.,20 an opera
15

This is not to say, however, that placement of the symbol on a public domain work

might not constitute actionable fraud or false advertising. See Parts III & IV.
17 Id.
'a See Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc. v. New Opera Co., 81 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1948).
Cf 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 10.13[A], at 101-102
(1993) (hereinafter NIMMER) ("An assignment or license of copyright commonly contains a
warranty to the effect that 'neither the work nor any part thereof is in the public domain.' ").
19In the patent context, one leading treatise reports that "[wiarranty of title is implied
in every assignment of a patent right." 5 ERNEST B. LIPScOMB, III, LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 19.25, at 428 (1986). The rule is the same for real property. See ROGER ACUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 722-24 (2d ed. 1993). Cf U.C.C. § 2-312 ("there
is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that title conveyed shall be good, and its
transfer rightful").
2o 81 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1948).
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company purchased the right to perform the comic opera "The
Merry Widow" for $50,000 a year. After a little more than a year
of performances, the company discovered that the work had passed
into the public domain several years before due to a failure on the
part of the copyright holder to renew the copyright. It ceased
paying royalties, and after being sued by the owner of the abandoned copyright, counterclaimed for damages in the amount paid
to the owner on a breach of warranty/failure of consideration
theory. The trial court awarded the opera company $50,500 in
damages, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgement, finding
that "The Merry Widow" "passed, finally, completely and forever
into the public domain and became freely available to the unrestricted use of anyone ....
New Opera's pleas of breach of
warranty and total failure
of
consideration
were established, and
21
by undisputed proof."
At the end of the opinion, the court of appeals considered the
argument that the company, as a licensee, was estopped from
denying the validity of the copyright subject to the license. At the
time, many jurisdictions held that patent licensees were estopped
from challenging the validity of the licensed patent.2 2 The court
of appeals held that, irrespective of the appeal licensee estoppel
may have in situations where the validity of a patent is disputed
on its merits,' licensee estoppel has no room for operation when
applied to a copyrighted work that has entered the public domain.
The recognition of the importance of the public domain was central
to defeating an implied estoppel.
In fact, the Seventh Circuit has held that even an express
agreement made by the licensee not to challenge the validity of the
copyright is unenforceable if the work subject to the license turns
out to be public domain expression. 24 The significance of the
public domain is underscored by another holding in the case--that

Id. at 74.
But see Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (preempting on patent law policy
grounds state laws that operated to estop a licensee from challenging the validity of a
patent).
' A patented item must be new, useful, and a significant advance over prior art. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988).
2 Saturday Evening Post v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Posner, J.).
21
22
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an express no-contest clause should be enforceable against a
licensee if the challenge to the copyright is based on ownership
rather than validity. In other words, if B rather than A is the true
owner of the copyright at issue, a licensee of A would be estopped
from denying A's ownership of the mark by an express no-contest
clause in the license agreement. However, under no circumstances
can A's licensee be prevented from asserting that the work subject
to A's spurious copyright is in the public domain. Commentators
have approved of the portion of the Rumbleseat opinion that denies
estoppel.25
Although cases like Tams-Witmark and Rumbleseat are rare, the
leading commentator wholeheartedly approves in his treatise of a
cause of action for breach of warranty," and other cases support
the notion that contracts should not be read to authorize the
payment of royalties for works in the public domain.27 In a
situation where a consumer has paid a sum of money for the use of
an invalid copyright, the difference between the value of the good
as promised (presumably what was paid) and the good as received
($0) should equal the whole amount paid by the consumer.
Interestingly, the realization that the spurious copyright is
worthless has led some to conclude that "total failure of consideration" might constitute a separate ground to allege a breach.28
Such a cause of action is hard to justify under black letter notions
of contract consideration where "the owner of the historic estate of
'Blackacre'... can sell it for a peppercorn. " 29 In other words, the
worthlessness of the peppercorn does not constitute a failure of
consideration. One legal chestnut commonly found in contracts

"See NIMMER, supra note 18, at 10.15[B], 10-123 to 10-129. Nimmer disagrees strongly
with Posner's view that a no-contest agreement might sometimes be enforceable. He would

not allow licensee estoppel to work under any circumstances. Id. at 126-29.
2Id. at 127-29.
27 See April Prods. v. G. Schirmer, Inc., 126 N.E.2d 283, 289 (N.Y. 1955) (construing
vague agreement not to provide for payments after licensed work had entered public domain
and indicating contrary reading would result in injustice and absurdity).
28 Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc. v. New Opera Co., 81 N.E.2d 70, 74 (N.Y. 1948); see
also NIMMER, supranote 18, at 10.15[B], 10-129 (arguing position similar to Tams-Witmark).
"See Jackson v. Seymour, 71 S.E.2d 181 (Va. 1952) (citing Planters Nat. Bank v. Heflin
Co., 184 S.E. 216, 219 (Va. 1936)).
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textbooks, Hardesty v. Smith,3 ° holds that as long as the buyer
has purchased a "something," consideration is present and the
contract is enforceable, even if the "something" is worthless. In
Hardesty, the buyer purchased the right to an improvement on a
lamp that turned out to be utterly worthless, yet the court enforced
the promissory note signed by the buyer and given in exchange for
the worthless right. Similarly, a buyer of a worthless copyright
should not be heard to complain of a failure of consideration.
Consideration doctrine is not designed to protect a consumer
against bad judgment.
When we recognize a cause of action on the part of the aggrieved
licensee of a spurious copyright, we are not paternalistically
correcting an unwise purchase, but rather enforcing an implied
promise made by the seller that it has good title to the goods it
sells.3 ' When the proverbial Rube buys the Brooklyn Bridge, we
find a breach because the seller purported to have title, not because
the buyer got a bad deal for his money. And, as noted by the courts
in both Tams-Witmark and Rumbleseat, public policy based on
nurturing the public domain should overcome notions of contractual
autonomy to support actions brought by aggrieved licensees.
The recognition of a right to recover payments is relatively easy
if the license agreement expressly warrants title, or if we imply a
claim of good title from the presence of the copyright symbol. The
putative owner of a copyright might argue, however, that no
warranty is made by a payment demand in the presence of the
symbol, but rather the implied offer is merely a promise not to sue
if payments are made. Even if the offer is so characterized, the
resulting agreement would be void and payment refundable unless
a colorable argument could be made that the copyright was
valid.32 Given the age of a Bach Cantata or a Shakespearean
play, a colorable argument as to their copyrightability would be
impossible to make. Of course, a sufficiently original arrangement

30 3 Ind. 39 (1851); see ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILMAN, CONTRAcT AND
RELATED OBLIGATION 47-48 (2d. ed. 1992).
-"See NIMMER, supra note 18, at § 10.13[B].
3See
Springstead v. Nees, 109 N.Y.S. 148, 150-51 (1908) (holding that promise to convey
land in return for not bringing suit is unenforceable in absence of colorable right to sue); 1
ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 140, at 596-600 (1963) (stating that promise given
in return for promise not to sue is unenforceable when no colorable right to recovery exists).
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of a Bach Cantata would be independently copyrightable. When
the arrangement is not quite original enough, however, and the
owner of the spurious copyright can make a colorable argument
that the arrangement met the requisite degree of originality, the
licensee's purchase of the right not to be sued is arguably enforceable.
This escape clause for the putative copyrightist is only available,
however, when a reasonable offeree would not assume that a
warranty of validity has been made and a colorable claim of
validity can be articulated. Given that an offeree reasonably
assumes the presence of the copyright symbol to mean "We have
title to this work," the characterization of the offer as a mere
promise not to sue should seldom provide a defense.
II.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT/RESTITUTION

Recovery based on restitutionary principles should be available
when a consumer's mistaken belief in a copyright's validity was
innocently, negligently, or fraudulently induced. Unlike a warranty
claim, a cause of action based on misrepresentation or inducement
seeks not to enforce the implied promise of copyright validity, but
rather to disavow the deal, seek rescission, and recover money paid.
In other words, the action is in restitution to prevent the licensor's
unjust enrichment, instead of in contract to recover damages for the
breach of warranty.
Once again, the presence of the copyright symbol is the key. The
symbol is a purposeful expression made by the putative copyright
owner that induces the payment on the part of the consumer. The
symbol printed in conjunction with royalty terms or a request to
pay the CCC induces payment, while the symbol standing alone or
in conjunction with other words may induce the purchase of
another copy of the work by a consumer afraid to photocopy.
Innocent or negligent misrepresentation is not a defense.33 The
party who makes a misrepresentation that induces a payment that
would not otherwise have been made must disgorge the benefit
received.

' See Bates v. Cashman, 119 N.E. 663 (Mass. 1918); 3 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION § 3.19, at 347-53 (1978); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 16 & cmts. (1937).
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A remedy may even be available in a situation where a misrepresentation is not found. Mistake of fact on the part of the party
making payment may be enough. Section 24 of the Restatement of
Restitution would seem to be directly on point:
[A] right to restitution exists in favor of a person
who, erroneously believing because of a mistake of
fact that another has a right, title, or power. .. and
induced by such mistake has paid money to the other
in exchange for the transfer of or promise to transfer
the right or title ... because of the non-existence of
such right, title or power, ... fails to receive what it
was agreed he should receive.'
Such a situation might arise, for example, when Joe Musician hears
a public domain song played for the first time and offers Jane
Singer $1000 for the right to perform it. If the surprised Jane
accepts, Joe may be entitled to restitution based on the mistaken
payment principle of section 24 of the Restatement of Restitution.3 5
An exception to this rule may exist in the situation where Jane
has a colorable argument that she owns the copyright to the song.
The comments to section 24 state that although normally "[a]
purchaser is entitled to the return of the purchase price if,
unknown to the buyer, ... [a] patent or copyright is invalid,"
restitution is not required unless "the seller was aware of the
invalidity."'
If a seller can demonstrate a good faith belief in
ownership of the spurious copyright, then the buyer may be
remediless in the absence of an affirmative misrepresentation. The
exception articulated by comment (f) dovetails with the conclusion

3 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 24(1) (1937).
35 For a nice illustration of this principle, see PALMER, supra note 33, at 12(c), 643-44,
which describes the plight of a buyer who discovers he has bought property that is already
his. "It would pass all bounds ofreason to hold that a vendor who has received $10,000 from
a purchaser, as consideration for the transfer of title to land which the purchaser already
owns, can keep the $10,000." Id. In a very real sense our hypothetical Joe Musician already
.owns' the song he buys from Jane. We, the public, "own" the public domain. [Special
thanks
to Andrew Kull for this point].
36
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 24 cmt. (f) (1937).
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in Part I that a colorable claim of validity may on rare occasions
insulate a seller in a situation where no warranty of title can be
implied. In fact, comment (f) suggests that a patent licensee, in the
absence of a warranty of title, is only purchasing the right not to be
sued for infringement. As noted above, the purchase of a right to
be free from a lawsuit is enforceable when a colorable claim of right
to sue can be made.
This principle is illustrated by Transitron Electronic Corp. v.
Hughes Aircraft Co.,' which expressly relies on section 24.
Transitron sought restitution for royalties paid to Hughes under a
license to use a patent that was subsequently declared invalid. The
First Circuit held that in the absence of fraud committed by
Hughes, Transitron would have to be satisfied with the voiding of
the unexecuted portions of the license agreement. Hughes's
conduct did not sink to a level sufficient to require restitution of
sums already paid. Hughes's "good faith belief" in its patent
prevented recovery. To the extent that the case provides that a
colorable claim to validity is a defense to restitution (but not
rescission or breach of warranty), it merely mirrors comment (f).
The case should not be read more broadly, however, to require
actual intent to defraud on the part of the licensor. The requirement of "fraud" in Transitronseems to be a proxy for "awareness"
of invalidity, the standard suggested by comment (f). The court
itself asserts that Transitron would prevail were it to show that
Hughes's patent claim was "contrary to [its] knowledge and
belief,"4 ° a standard clearly short of intentional deception. Interestingly, the case does not discuss the existence of any express or
implied warranty made by Hughes that the patent was valid. It
therefore should not be read to threaten causes of action based on
breach of warranty or misrepresentation when fraud is absent.
"'See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
38 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981).
See also St. Regis Paper Co. v. Royal Indus., 552 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1977)
(disallowing refund of royalties paid for use of invalid patent); Zenith Lab. v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc. 530 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that patent licensee could not, under federal or
state law, recover royalties paid on invalid patent prior to judicial determination of patent's
invalidity); Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1972) (declaring
that determination of patent's invalidity does not entitle licensee to recoup royalties already
paid).
40 Transitron,649 F.2d at 877.
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Finally, if the case were read very broadly to require proof of
licensor fraud as a prerequisite to restitutionary recovery, even in
cases where the facts indicate that an implied warranty was made
or when a reasonable licensee was induced by a false claim of
patent, the differences between copyrights and patents militate a
different result in copyright cases. As a practical matter, patent
licenses are usually actively negotiated bilateral agreements
between the patent owner and the licensee, unlike the typical sort
of unilateral offer and acceptance that occurs when a consumer
sends $1.00 per page into the CCC. This gives a patent licensee
greater opportunity to inquire about a warranty of title or demand
the inclusion of one in the contract.4 ' When a negotiated agreement lacks a specific clause warranting the validity of the patent,
the licensee's reliance on the existence of a warranty seems
somewhat less reasonable.
In addition, as noted in Transitron itself, patent law decisions
embrace a policy favoring early adjudication of the validity of a
patent. A rule requiring proof of actual fraud as a predicate to
licensee recovery provides incentives for early challenges by the
licensee to the patent. Any delay results in a loss to the licensee
who successfully challenged the patent. Such an early adjudication
policy is not articulated in copyright case law. A copyright does not
convey the sort of monopoly power that a patent does-the
economic damage done by the wrongful grant of a copyright is not
so extensive.4 2 Federal law recognizes this by putting substantial
procedural hurdles before those seeking a patent (the requirements
of novelty, usefulness, and, especially, non-obviousness), 4 whereas
the copyright registration process is virtually a rubber stamp. The
only substantive requirement is a minimal degree of originality.
We are less worried about wrongfully issued copyrights, so we have
less of a need to punish those who delay in litigating the invalidity
of a particular copyright.

41 Of course,

some copyright licenses are negotiated. See Tams-Witmark Music Library,

Inc. v. New Opera Co., 81 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1948) (discussed supra at notes 18, 20, 29 and
accompanying
text).
42

Rumbleseat makes this assertion with a good deal of force. Saturday Evening Post v.
Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.).
4 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988).
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Finally, as noted above, an independent agency passes on the
patentability of inventions. The process is imperfect. Many
patents are declared invalid in litigation," mostly on non-obviousness grounds, a challenge that is unavailable against a copyright.
A reasonable patent licensee is less likely to assume the owner has
impliedly warranted his patent when its status is rather unsure.
Given the greater degree of reliance a licensee should have on the
validity of a copyright, the lesser the need to enhance the mens rea
requirement of the licensor of the spurious copyright. The case
most clearly on point supports this distinction. In Tams-Witmark,
restitution of royalties paid was awarded with no requirement that
actual fraud be proven by the licensee.45
III. FRAUD

Parts I and II present causes of action based on breach of
contract and unjust enrichment that enable a consumer to recover
payments made in response to a spurious claim of copyright in a
public domain text. The focus so far has been on breach of
warranty of title, misrepresentation, and mistaken payment. Some
putative copyright owners know that their claims of right are false,
or behave recklessly in claiming a copyright. In these cases, the
consumer's right to recover royalties paid is indisputable.46
Proving actual fraud, however, does create the opportunity to make
a credible claim for punitive damages, which may be necessary to
deter future false claims.
According to Prosser, fraud consists of:
the intent that a representation shall be made, that
it shall be directed to a particular person or class of
persons, that it shall convey a certain meaning, that
it shall be believed,
and that it shall be acted upon
47
in a certain way.

Cf. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803 (1988).
"Tams-Witmark, 81 N.E.2d at 70.
• See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 748
(5th ed. 1984).
47 Id. at 741.
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In a case where a copyright symbol has been placed on a text, my
Bach Cantata for example, with the knowledge that the work is in
the public domain, all the above elements seem to be easily
satisfied. In fact, if the publisher places the symbol "without any
belief as to its truth, or with reckless disregard whether it be true
or false,""s its representation, if relied upon, will constitute fraud.
This sort of reckless disregard would almost certainly be present
whenever a copyright is claimed on a text obviously in the public
domain because of its age.
Most states provide for punitive damages for willful fraud. For
example, the Official Code of Georgia, section 51-12-5.1(b), states
that punitive damages are available "in tort actions in which it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's
actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness,
oppression or that entire want of care which would raise the
presumption of conscious indifference to consequences."4 9 Exemplary damages may also be available for reckless conduct."0
Consciously or recklessly made invalid claims of copyright would
seem to be an especially appropriate situation for the application
of punitive damages. A claim of copyright can be made extremely
cheaply, therefore compensatory damages will not adequately deter
future fraudulent conduct. Imagine a publisher who obtains a
copyright for a Vivaldi Concerto purportedly "arranged" by Cal
Composer in 1993. The publisher knows that the arrangement is
unoriginal or is recklessly indifferent to its originality, yet places
the copyright symbol on the sheet music to discourage photocopying
of the original sheet music it sells or directs the payment of a

Id. at 74142.
CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (Michie 1993) (emphasis added); see also TEX. CwV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a) (West Supp. 1994) ("Exemplary damages may be awarded
only if the claimant proves that the personal injury, property damage, death, or other harm
with respect to which the claimant seeks recovery of exemplary damages results from: (1)
fraud; (2) malice; or (3) gross negligence."). See also Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va.
1982) (finding exemplary damages appropriate where tort committed with intent).
"o See, e.g., Bowen v. Waters, 316 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) ("Malice required for
recovery of exemplary damages need not amount to ill will, hatred, or vindictiveness of
purpose; it is sufficient if defendant's acts were wanton or were done with reckless disregard
or of conscious indifference to rights of plaintiff"); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Young, 145 S.E.2d
700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) ("Exemplary damages may also be available for when the conduct
is extremely reckless or utterly in disregard for its consequences.").
4

49 GA.
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certain sum per copy to a national copyright clearing house. Under
general tort, contract, or unjust enrichment principles, a consumer
who has paid a royalty to reproduce the work, or who has been
tricked into buying more sheet music rather than photocopying, can
certainly obtain restitution. Many consumers, however, will not
challenge the copyright, and the publisher will pocket the payments
induced by its fraud. Since the marginal cost of making the
spurious claim is virtually zero, the fear of occasional reimbursement will not deter the fraudulent practice.
A publisher will only have the proper incentive to cease a
fraudulent practice when the cost of committing the fraud outweighs the benefits. In the absence of punitive damages, collecting
a couple of mispayments will probably allow the publisher to recoup
its investment in making the fraudulent misstatement. If punitive
damages are awarded in an amount at least equal to the expected
gain from the fraud, divided by the possibility of the fraud being
discovered and punished, then the fraudulent practice should, in
theory, no longer be profitable. So, if a publisher expects to receive
$10,000 from each misrepresentation that it owns a valid copyright,
and it expects to get caught and be found liable about a third of the
time, then a court award of at least $30,000 is necessary to deter
the publisher from routinely continuing its practice.
Deterring spurious copyright claims is especially important given
public policy favoring the development and protection of the public
domain. The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution
authorizes Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. "51 By
granting limited statutory monopolies to authors and inventors
(and thereby imposing a direct cost on the public), Congress has
attempted to stimulate new creations. When the monopoly expires,
as it must according to the constitutional mandate of "limited
Times," then the creation enters the public domain. Recently, in
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,2 the Court
emphasized the dangerousness of attempts to assert monopoly
rights over creations that have entered the public domain. In that

6' U.S. CONST., art. I,

§ 8, cl. 8.

489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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case, a Florida statute provided patent-like protection for boat hulls
in the public domain. In holding that the Florida law conflicted
with federal intellectual property law policy, the Court decried the
protection of creations in the public domain and noted the damage
done when such claims of right are asserted:
[Protecting public domain] information would not
only serve no socially useful purpose, but would in
fact injure the public ....

[Federal law] ensure[s]

that ideas in the public domain remain there for the
use of the public.'
Public policy articulated by the Framers of the Constitution,
Congress, and the judiciary establishes the critical importance of
maintaining the integrity of the public domain. In fact, the Court
in Feist clearly implied a constitutional right to copy material in
the public domain. When compensatory damages do not adequately
deter the systematic pillaging of our greatest public resource, an
award of punitive damages would seem to be especially appropriate.
IV. FALSE ADVERTISING
Every state has enacted statutes that prohibit "unfair methods
of competition and unfair acts or practices."54 These so-called
"Little FTC" statutes expressly incorporate Federal Trade Commission false-advertising regulations and decisions into the law of the
state.55 In addition, in all states except Arkansas, Iowa, Nevada,
North Dakota, and Oklahoma, consumers, as well as competitors,
have a private cause of action against false advertisers for damag-

' Id. at 148, 150 (quoting Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979));
see also id. at 151 ([F]ederal... laws must determine not only what is protected, but also
what is free for all to use.").

5See KENNETH A. PLEVAN & MIRIAM SIROKY, ADVERTISING COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 289-

91. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500-17577 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 349-350 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2,
1 261 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
"PLEVAN & SIROKY, supra note 54, at 289-91.
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es. 5 6 These statutes, although not yet exploited by consumers
seeking relief from false claims of copyright, may provide the
easiest means of increasing the costs of those who impoverish the
public domain. These statutes are especially powerful tools because
liability is strict (the intent of the party making the false claim is
irrelevant) 57 and many provide for much more than merely
compensatory damages. 8
Under generally accepted false advertising principles, the placing
of a copyright symbol on a public domain work, or an overbroad
claim that "all copying is illegal" (implying that fair use 59 could
never justify copying), would clearly constitute actionable deception.
In its landmark decision in In re Cliffdale, ° the FTC set forth the
following three requirements to establish deceptive advertising:
1. the representation must be likely to mislead the
consumer;
2. the representation must be viewed from the
perspective of the reasonable consumer;
3. the representation must be material.6 '
Claimants need not prove actual reliance on a representation, nor
an intent to deceive.6 2 A reasonable consumer surely views the
placement of a copyright symbol on a text as a claim that the
publisher of the text owns a valid copyright in the work. The
reasonable consumer needing multiple copies of the work is likely
to be misled into paying a royalty to copy the work in question or
purchasing more originals of the work. For example, a reasonable

6 Id.
6 Id. at 294.
b See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1988) (permitting
punitive damages); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3) (West 1984) (mandating double
recovery); N.C. STAT. ANN. § 75-16 (West 1987) (mandating triple recovery); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 100.20(5) (West 1988) (permitting double recovery).
' Cf Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 62 U.S.L.W. 4169,4173-74 (1994) (holding that
even blatantly commercial copying may sometimes constitute fair use).
w 103 F.T.C. 110, 190-96 (1984); see also Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement on
Deception, issued Oct. 14, 1983, reprintedin 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 689 (BNA) (Oct.
27, 1983).
1
Id. at 689-90.
2 PLEVAN & SIROKY, supra note 54, at 294.
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choir director confronted with the copyright symbol on a work she
wants the choir to perform will either pay the requested fee to
photocopy the work for the choir's use or buy more sheet music.
Given the penalties available for copyright infringement,' this is
not only a reasonable but an extremely prudent course of action.
The sparse case law on the subject suggests that a false claim of
copyright constitutes per se deceptive advertising. In EFS Marketing, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co.," the court examined a false advertising claim brought by the seller of one public domain troll doll
against another.'
The plaintiffs third cause of action alleged
improper use of the copyright symbol on the public domain trolls
marketed by the defendant. The court stated that displays of
"invalid [copyright] registrations are per se violations" of federal
false advertising law.66 The court denied relief to the plaintiff,
however, because it offered no proof of actual damage. One can
imagine that a competitor would inevitably have a difficult time
with the damage issue in these cases absent proof that sales were
diverted due to a consumer preference for buying goods with a
copyright symbol on them instead of fungible goods without the
symbol. Consumers themselves have no such problem proving
damages given the payments they make to the publisher induced
by the misrepresentation.
Given the arguable relevance in some contract, unjust enrichment, or tort contexts of the copyright claimant's intent or good
faith belief in the validity of the copyright at issue, a claim based
on false advertising principles seems to be the most promising
vehicle for protecting the public domain. Not only is the burden of
proof low, but the opportunity for enhanced damages and attorneys'
fees helps to address the deterrence issues discussed in Part III
above.

"See supra note 3 and accompanying text (enumerating criminal penalties).

"836 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
"Since this was a competitor suit, it was brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Section 43(a) makes actionable as between
competitors a "false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause confusion."
Id. at § 1125(aXl). Since this standard is harder to meet than the FTC standard, see supra
notes 60-61 and accompanying text, the case is particularly relevant precedent.
6EFS Marketing, 836 F. Supp. at 133 (emphasis in original).
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V. CLASS ACTIONS

Very few individual victims of spurious copyright claims have the
economic incentive to bring suit on their own behalf. The plaintiff
in "The Merry Widow" case 7 who paid $50,000 for the right to use
a public domain work, is certainly the exception, rather than the
rule:
The major obstacle preventing purchasers from
policing market deception through legal action is the
difference in the relative gains between the purchaser and the seller in winning a lawsuit. In many
instances, the costs of litigation to the consumer will
far exceed the amount of the harm suffered from the
deception and accordingly the amount of recovery in
the event of success. The defendant, on the other
hand, faced with the widespread affects [sic] on his
method of operation of an adverse decision has
greater incentive to expend resources in defense of
his conduct."
Unfortunately, federal law does not yet provide an adequate class
action mechanism to address this problem in the context of
consumer deception."
Consumers do not have standing under
either the Lanham Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act to
bring suits for false representations and deception.7" Any class
action suit based on diversity of citizenship will fail if any of the
class members has not suffered the jurisdictionally required
72
damages ($50,0007' as of 1990).

See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
8 EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROCESS 170 (rev'd 4th ed. 1991).
"See FED. R. Civ. PRO. 23 (setting forth class action requirements for parties in federal

court).
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1973) (establishing FTC as sole enforcer of FTC rules and
regulations); Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971) (no
consumer standing under Lanham Act).
"' See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1988).
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State law, however, can provide the necessary class action vehicle
to consumers who have been duped into paying royalties or
purchasing unnecessary originals of public domain works." Some
states expressly authorize consumer class actions for violations of
deceptive trade practices acts or little FTC statutes.7 4 Others
provide such relief by decision.75 For example, in Brooks v. MidasInternational Corp.,7 the Illinois Court of Appeals held that a
class action was properly maintained in a case involving a muffler
company's misrepresentations regarding its installation charges.
In Hayna v. Arby's, Inc.7 7 a class of plaintiffs successfully maintained an action against a fast-food restaurant that had allegedly
misrepresented its sandwiches as "Roast Beef." The case was
amenable to class treatment because the improper advertising
practices were uniform and general in their application to class
members, the class action avoided multiplicity of suits, and the
complaint readily informed the restaurant of class members. 78
Many other cases79 permit a deceived class of consumers to
proceed in a unitary action, as long as similar misrepresentations
were made to all class members (which is generally true in cases
involving mass advertising).
Suits based on spurious claims of copyright would seem to be
particularly amenable to class treatment. The same misrepresenta-

" See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (providing that under Rule
23, even unnamed members of class must have suffered requisite $10,000 injury); Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (holding that members of class could not aggregate claims to
meet requirement of $10,000 in alleged damages).
" A class action seeking only injunctive relief may also be available when the wrong
alleged is the overbroad claim of "all copying is illegal" on a legitimately copyrighted work.
The damage claim, however, is not amenable to class action procedure because the
availability of fair use-which makes the absolute claim of right literally false-is an
extremely fact-intensive inquiry.
74
See PLEVAN & SIROKY, supra note 54, at 293.
See cases discussed in Mary J. Cavins, Annotation, Consumer Class Actions Based on
Fraudor Misrepresentation,53 A.L.R.3d 534 (1973 & 1993 Supp.).
76 361 N.E.2d 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
7 425 N.E.2d 1174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
78
Id. at 1182-83.
" See, e.g., Amato v. General Motors Corp., 463 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)
(misrepresentation concerning brand of car engine); State ex rel. Guste v. General Motors
Corp., 370 So. 2d 477 (La. 1978) (misrepresentation concerning brand of car engine); Compact
Electra Corp. v. Paul, 403 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1977) (consistent misrepresentations concerning
vacuum cleaners made in "canned" sales presentations by salesmen).
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tion is made to all the class members. A complaint can be drafted
that clearly informs the defendant as to the precise nature of the
misrepresentation and the damages claimed (the amount of
royalties paid to use a particular workS°). Identification of every
class member is problematic, but most courts are willing to accept
notice by publication in situations where a good faith effort will not
actually identify some individual members of the class.81 Given
the small size of the claims, the difficulty in bringing individual
claims, and the fact that the class seeks to enforce a right vested
with a strong public interest-the protection of the public domain-state courts should not hesitate to certify a class of plaintiffs
in a case involving a spurious copyright.
The preceding discussion presumes a class of plaintiffs against a
single defendant. An action might also be available against a class
of defendants, especially when they have formally organized
themselves into a corporation for the purposes of obtaining
royalties. Most of the revenue collected by the Copyright Clearance
Center is generated by the licensing of validly copyrighted works;
some however is not. An action against the members of the CCC
might take two forms. First, a plaintiff might ask for injunctive
relief against the collection of royalties for public domain material.
Second, a plaintiff might ask for the disgorgement of all royalties
paid for public domain works. The suit for damages poses substantial difficulties in identifying the amount of damages 2 and the
victims. A good deal of creativity would have to be exercised by the
court in order to properly certify the class. The effort would be
worth it, however, if a significant deterrent effect on spurious
go In a situation where the damage is not royalties paid to the publisher, but rather
multiple originals purchased from the publisher, the amount of damage done is not so clear.
Some copies would have been sold even in the absence of the copyright symbol. In such a
case, the burden should be placed on the guilty party to prove its profits had the fake claim
not been made.
"' See, e.g., Vancouver Women's Health Collective Soc'y v. A.H. Robins, 820 F.2d 1359,
1364 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that program for notifying foreign claimants developed by
Dalkon Shield manufacturer at court's discretion and with help of advertising firm was
reasonable because information was widely received and news was broadly disseminated).
82 Perhaps 1000 works licensed through the CCC could be chosen at random and the
number of public domain works within that group identified. One could then compare the
percentage of royalties paid for the public domain works with the percentage paid for
legitimately copyrighted works. The resulting ratio could be multiplied by the CCC's gross
income to provide an estimate of the amount of profit made from public domain materials.
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copyright claims were to result.
The most promising use of the class action device would be an
action in a state court brought by a plaintiff class against a
resident defendant. Under the Zahn decision,' a federal district
court might lack subject matter jurisdiction over such an action,"
but in a state court subject matter jurisdiction would not be a
problem, and the personal jurisdiction defense would not be
available to a resident defendant. Assuming that the state's
provision for the certification of class actions imposes requirements
similar to the requirements imposed by Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the only serious obstacles to certification
would relate to the practical inability to identify all of the members
of the plaintiff class. If the court could be persuaded to approve a
strategy, short of personal notice to each class member, for
notifying members of the plaintiff class of the pendency of the
action, and if the governing state law permits so-called "fluid
recoveries" in class actions, then the court should certify the action.
A bilateral class action brought by a plaintiff class against a
defendant class, even in a state court, would be more problematic.
Personal jurisdiction might be a problem, either under state law or

Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
s' The Zahn Court ruled that each member of the plaintiff class in a diversity-based class
action must have a claim that satisifies the amount-in-controversy requirement. Id. at 301.
Perhaps a federal class action could be structured in a way that overcomes the Zahn
obstacle. An ambitious punitive damages claim, distributed over a relatively small class,
could bring each class member's recovery over the $50,000 limit. See, e.g., Packard v.
Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir.) (punitive damages are properly
considered in class action in determining whether jurisdictional amount has been satisified),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 440 (1993). Moreover, there is some slight support, both in the
academy and in the reports, for the proposition that Congress overruled Zahn when it
amended the statute governing supplemental jurisdiction. E.g., Garza v. National Am. Ins.
Co., 807 F. Supp. 1256, 1258 n.6 (M.D. La. 1992); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer,
Graspingat Burnt Straws: The Disasterof the SupplementalJurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY
L.J. 963, 981 (1991). The weight of academic and judicial opinion on the effect of the
amendment, however, seems to be the other way. See Packard, 994 F.2d at 1045 n.9
(collecting cases and commentary). In the unlikely event that Zahn is no longer good law,
a federal court presumably could exercise jurisdiction over a class action in which at least
one plaintiffs claim met the amount-in-controversy requirement, because the court could
assert supplemental jurisdiction over claims that did not satisfy the requirement. See Mayo
v. Key Fin. Servs., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 277, 278 (D. Mass. 1993) (noting argument that because
one of named plaintiffs meets requirements for diversity, court has jurisdiction over other
plaintiffs under new supplemental jurisdiction statute, but rejecting proposition that Zahn
has been overruled legislatively).
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under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Moreover, the bilateral character of the action might make it
ineligible for certification under the state's interpretation of the socalled typicality requirement.8 6 An adequate representative of the
defendant class would be necessary. 7 Although the Copyright
Clearance Center might qualify as an adequate representative, this
cannot be taken for granted. Then there is the very practical
problem that members of the defendant class could opt out of a
damages class action en mass," and if this seems likely to the
state court judge, the judge might deny certification at the outset
on the ground that the action is not manageable as a class
action.89
CONCLUSION

Unless publishers are made to bear the cost of their misrepresentations, they will have no incentive to remove false copyright
notices from the works they sell. Nor will they have any incentive
to cease the sort of intimidation consumers confront whenever they
seek to photocopy a text. Successful actions brought on the
grounds asserted herein-breach of warranty, unjust enrichment,
fraud, and false advertising-might help stem the tide of misrepresentation and confusion. This is especially true if courts, under
either a fraud or false advertising theory, exercise their prerogative

' See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 n.3 (1985) (declining to address
question of extent to which jurisdictional due process limits jurisdiction of state courts over

defendant classes).
" Cf La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding
"typicality is lacking when the representative plaintiff's cause of action is against a
defendant unrelated to the defendants against whom the cause of action of the members of
the class lies").
""See, e.g., Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n of Illinois, 97 F.R.D. 668
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that not-for-profit trade association is adequate class representative
for member defendants).
" See In re Lilco Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663, 673 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (granting plaintiffs'
motions to certify consolidated cases with eight subclasses of plaintiffs and four subclasses
of defendants, and rejecting defendants' argument that "opt out" provision of Rule 23(bX3)
renders class certification meaningless).
" Cf Heffier v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 1992 WL 50095, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10,
1992) (denying certification of defendant class because of extreme likelihood that majority
of class members would opt out).
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to award punitive or other augmented damages and attorneys' fees.
In fact, because of the lower burden of proof, the greater possibility
of proceeding as a class, and the availability of enhanced damages,
suits based on state deceptive trade practices acts seem to hold the
most promise. Until the publishing industry is jolted into compliance with sound public policy, consumers will continue to be
induced to part with their money by spurious claims of copyright.
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APPENDIX A

JOHANN SEBASTIAN BACH

Missa
Symbolum Nicenum
Sanctus
Osanna, Benedictus, Agnus Dei
et Dona nobis pacem
genannt: Messe in h-moll
called: Mass in B minor
BWV 232

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON
EDITED BY
FRIEDRICH SMEND

BARENREITER KASSEL • BASEL. LONDON - NEW YORK
TP1
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BESETZUNG

ENSEMBLE

Soli: 2 Soprane, Alt, Tenor, BaS; Chor:

gemischte Stimmen; Orchester:

2

[Vol. 1:259

5-8

Flbten, 3 Oboen,

2 Oboen d'amore, 2 Fagotte, Como da caccia,

3 Trompeten, Pauken, 2 Violinen, Viola, Continuo
(Violoncello, Violone, Fagott, Orgel)

Soli: 2 Sopranos, Alto, Tenor. Bass; Chorus 5-8
mixed voices; Orchestra: 2 Flutes, 3 Oboes, 2 Oboes
d'amore, 2 Bassoons, Como da caccia, 3 Trumpets,
Timpani, 2 Violins, Viola, Continuo (Violoncello,
Double Bass, Bassoon, Organ)

Auffiihrungsdauer /Duration: ca. 13 5 min.
Urtextausgabe aus: Johann Sebastian Bach, Neue Ausgabe simtlicher Werke, herausgegeben vom JohannSebastian-Bach-Institut Gbttingen und vom Bach-Archiv Leipzig, Serie 11,Band 1: Messe in h-moll (BA 5001),
herausgegeben von Friedrich Smend. Neben dieser Taschenpartitur sind Klavierauszug (BA 5102a) und das
komplerte Auffiihrungsmaterial (BA 5102) erschienen.
Urtext edition taken from: Johann Sebastian Bach, Neue Ausgabe simtlicher Werke, issued by the JohannSebastian-Bach-Institut G6ttingen and the Bach-Archiv Leipzig, Series II,Volume 1: Messe in h-mol (BA 5001),
edited by Friedrich Smend. In addition to the present miniature score, the vocal score (BA5102a) and the complete
orchestral parts (BA 5102) are also published.
© 1954 Birenreiter-Verlag Karl Vtterle GmbH &Co. KG, Kassel und VEB Dcutscher Verlag fijr Musik, Leipzig
Alle Rechte vorbehalten/All rights reserved /Durchgesehene Auflage 1988 /Printed in Germany
Vervielfiiligungen jeglicher Art sind gesetlich verboten. / Any unauthorized reproduction is prohibited by law.
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APPENDIX B

The American Intellectual
Tradition
A Sourcebook
Volume I: 1620-1865

Edited by
DAVID A. HOLLINGER
University of Michigan
and
CHARLES CAPPER
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1989
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Oxford University Press
Oxford New York Toronto
Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi
PetalingJaya Singapore lHong Kong Tokyo
Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town
Melbourne Auckland
and associated companies in
Berlin Ibadan

Copyright © 1989 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.,
zoo Madison Avenue, New York, New York too16
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No pan of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Ubrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The American intellectual tradition.

Contents: v. t. i 620-1865-v.
2. 865 to the present.
i. United States-Intellectual life-Sources.
I. Hollinger, David A. I1.Capper. Charles
Ei69.I.A47218 1989 973 88-12632
ISBN 0-19-505774-0 (set)
ISBN 0-19-504461-4 (v. i)
ISBN 0-19504462-2 (v. 2)

246897531
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
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THE UNANIMOUS DECLARATION OF THE THIRTEEN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve
the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among
the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires
that they should declare the causes which'impel them to the separation. We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such
principlesand organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely
to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments
long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly
all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are
sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same
Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it
is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their
future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is
now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government.
The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and
usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over
these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world. He has refused
his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has
forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless
suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other Laws
for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and
formidable to tyrants only. He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual,
uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole
purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the
rights of the people. He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause
others to be elected; whereby the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have
returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time
exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within. He has
endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing
Source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. i, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Lyman H. Butterfield, and Mina R. Bryan
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 195o), 429-32. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University
Press. Copyright © 1950.
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122 November 17871
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves
to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence
of faction. The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed
for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without
violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The
instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth
been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries
to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made
by the American constitutions on the popular models, both antient and modern, cannot
certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend
that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and
expected. Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous
citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal
liberty; that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in
the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to
the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an
interested and over-bearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that
they are in some degree true. It will be found indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labour, have been erroneously
charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found at the same time,
that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and
particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and
alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other.
These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with
which a factious spirit has tainted our public administration.
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority
or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: The one, by removing
its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one by
destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every
citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it is worse than
the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which it
instantly expires. But it could-not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential
to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation
of air, which is essential to animal life because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
Source: The Papers of James Madison, vol. to, ed. Robert A. Rutland et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1977). 263-70, 476-8o. Editors' notes omitted. Reprinted by permission ofThe University of Chicago
Press, Copyright © 1977.
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APPENDIX C

LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN

The 32 Piano Sonatas
In reprints of the first and early editions,
principally froin the Anthony van Hoboken Collection
of the Austrian National Library

With prefaces by Dr. Brian Jeffery

VOLUME I
Piano Sonatas opus numbers 2 (nos. 1, 2, and 3),
7, 10 (nos. 1, 2, and 3), 13, 14 (nos. 1 and 2)

TECLA EDITIONS - PREACHERS' COURT - CHARTERHOUSE
LONDON ECIM 6AS - ENGLAND
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The contents of this five-volume set are as follows:
Volume I- Opus numbers 2 (nos. 1. 2. and 3), 7, 10 (nos. 1, 2, and 3). 13. 14 (nos. I and 2)
Volume It, Opus numbers 22, 26. 27 (nos. I and 2), 28. 31 (nos. 1. 2. and 3) (ZMrich, NAgeli)
Volume II: Opus numbers 31 (nos. 1, 2, and 3) (Bonn, Simtrock). 49 (nos. 1 and 2). 53. 54
Volume IV: Opus numbers 57, 78. 79. 81a. 90, 101, 109
Volume V: Opus numbers 106, 110, III (London. Clementi). III (Berlin, Schlesinger)
The present edition in five volumes is available both clothbound and paperbound.
The 32 piano sonatas are also available in the form of 27 items of sheet music, in reprints of the first and early editions, as they
were originally issued in Beethoven's time. Details are available from the publisher.
0 Tecla Editions 1989. No part of this publication may be photocopied, reproduced stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted,
In any form, or by any means, without the prior written permission of the publishers.
Printed by Artes GrAficas Soler. S. A. - La Olivereta, 28 - 46018 Valencia (Spain). on offset 112 g. paper.
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